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2. The Modern State
Abstract
Nothing manifests the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary institutions more than the modern
national state. Because in this country it reflects the demands of all the people and at the same time affects
them and all their other institutions, it is the prime example of institutional growth. It is not an exaggeration to
say that all other institutions serve but partial ends, no matter how total they may try to be in their relations
with their members. Designed to be small, it has become huge. Once limited to action which was mainly
negative, it has become more and more positive. Conceived in amateur terms, it has become a professional
bureaucracy. Viewed as decentralized, it has become highly centralized. Seen as doing but little, it has
expanded until there is scarcely any area of life which is unaffected by it. [excerpt]
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Comments
This is a part of Section XIX: An Analysis of the Contemporary World's Search for Meaning. The
Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as
the Table of Contents for both volumes.
More About Contemporary Civilization:
From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called
Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson’s request with the
goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”
Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.
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2. The Modern State 
Nnthing manlfont?ff the r^trp>ngthn and weaknesses of the contem-
]3orary institutions more_than. th^^ state. Because 
in" tliis country it reflects the demands of all tEe~"pe^le and at 
the same time affects them and all their other institutions, it is 
the prime example of institutional growth. It is not an exaggera­
tion to say that all other institutions serve but partial ends, no 
matter how total they mav-.J:jg,,t.Q,.-he.„±n their relations with their 
memljeri. Deigned to be small. hugp-. Once limited 
to action wliiclT^as mainly negative, it has become more and more 
positive. Conceived in amateur terms, it has become a professional 
bureaucracy, Viewed as decentralized, it has become highly centra-
lizeifc Sefen as doing but little, it has expanded until there is 
scarcely any area of life which is unaffected by it. 
We have already traced the historical development of the con­
temporary state. The Enlightenment political demand was for liberty 
of soiiie sort over against the powers of various absolutisms. But 
tlie same mpvoment in the name of.•liberty has resulted today in the 
apioearance o^~~a7^olitical authority the size and power of which is 
rau ch ^ gr e a t,.e,r.,.,„ t han' We s tern'"ma '"before j/ i*t iTesse^''Pel^ s 
never before has"'cTtizenship meant so much. 
There are many reasons for this development, some of which are 
imx^ortant for us to note in this chapter. One reason for the increas 
in goVernment is to be_j£oiind in the growing imporXance"V>f poii^ 
titrrc±'''"TCsprCct' o The idea of the economic man was success 
fully undermined by the twentieth century. For exE;.,ple, during 
17orld War I it became obvious that it was the political groups within 
a nation rather than the international proletariat which could and 
v/ovild unite. Or agaixi, if .anyone.,.whether^ or not a large trust 
is to be brokenthe priority..oX-pQliticareaex,aes''''"'1^S^ 
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in, thp rpasoRS that-arc by hnth nirlppi. There raay be no 
'^onomic reason for keeping a large corporation from grov/ing. 
Yet we insist that there should be limits to its growth unless, 
like the telephone company, it appears to be a natural monopoly. 
And v!Q insist in terms that are primarily political rather than 
economic. 3mall bvisi no'^'^pq nrst. hp from being swallowed 
up by our economic giants; but the i-easons for this are socior 
'vjiST T "f" *1 r» n 1 Y» n -i" fT ri-J- T'i n r*r\ n" " "  
Another reason for the growth of r^r.ntprnp^-parv r.tato i« 
to be found in the demands that are upon Western man 
limTered into the latest stage of his development with the liberal 
idea that the state v/as his own creation, an artifactwhich he had 
'^ade to be nis GorvsrivtX"~~'l^^ v/ere no limits to his desires. 
so ffiere could Be no'limits to what he demanded of it,  n nnr^F-qiiPnti y 
h'y- Rtore and3aQ.£g--^-J3-i^.-Sa£yatr^^ gap created bv 
the loss of his older standards: it should "estaTj'lish 1 hay "and 
it ^ould assume the burden_^f_£(a]iGa±ijag>Jiis--^^ ; it 
sTiould pro^egt M foreign competition: it should 
grant him lands for homesteadingy"lt "should Ijuil^^ it should 
taHeI5aEs::i)f.ll^ pliysdcal^aalJjtxp; ancfit should 
portoct him froia depreaalona. Man also, and in a different sense, 
asl-ed for something more. By his unwlilinrT^P'-''^ tr. r.vm 
desires.-4WS-made it nejiaag^x Jo J\§ve certain laws v/hich would 
restrain him ...at ...the points \ii ere "hj wouTg'~lioir"restrain himself. 
Cut of this situation grew the laws which regulate everything fro3 
food nanufacture to the selling of securities, and the buroaucri^-cy ^ 
nccessai-y to enforce these laws. The I'esvilts have been that 
Westex'ii uan, lil:e the poor fisherman in the story of the genie, 
fiads that his servant does not v/ant to shrink back to size, but 
tlircL-tcns to become his master. 
But there is .spsio-yiing even more important than the sheer 
..of our contempor£ry::i:ns:mSS.a3^03::i1iir:T^T 
they to and values. And, as there 
are no agreed limits for such values, there is nothing to keep them 
from becoming absolute and total. The state especially trios to 
build moxale and demand loyalty. Lacking anything above it, creating 
its own lav/s, anH-^gx^ng expression to modern nationalism, the 
state also creates its own duties and values. Loyalty hnrnnpc; -itp; 
£5UBXfiiae-A««r3r»e. Instead of public opinion, we may have policy and 
propaganda as the means of inculcating values and loyalty. The 
liberal order of values is thus reversed. The modern national state 
determines its policy and with it  confronts  ^ he individual 
Wiio IS armed only with his prT^te opinioiiT And this policv is 
Justified by reference_tqthe "people." 
s  t j j i s  t  i±M. tJ .  O  n  S  ^  and  t j lP  Qt ipypm oly^  yPfPT tn 1-?-.^ 
people and what the people jvant^^ a the court of lasta^peaTT" The 
"people" is interpreted as a self-sufficient"socieTy^eyond which 
there is no appeal; Vox popull vox Dei. The only major question 
left is whether the voice of ^He people has been correctly inter­
preted, hence our current interest in public opinion polls. 
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This situation ia greatly aggravated by the external 
relatioriCIMlW^tern stjttea- Without a'ny~TnTerna?n:onal~^ or 
institution with power enough to check national states, the 
present international scene resembles most clearly a naked 
struggle for power. It is like Hobbes' state of nature, only the 
participants are now the power rather than individuals. WP; have 
now the spectacle of two huge states armingL^r--a.-]aattle v/hlch 
"tliey U6' not seriously v/ant to fisht. The additional Dov/er of 
nuclear weapons only heightens the power factor in the situation. 
It is not surprising that we often speak of "garrison states," 
or that we have called ours the age of anxiety. 
